Don’t Expect Asia’s Muslims To Warn China

  • As China’s leadership faces pressure over the treatment of minorities in Xinjiang, Muslims in other parts of Asia can do little but express dissent
  • Muslim identity politics in Asia differs from that in the Middle East making cross-national Muslim blocs an unlikely threat to China

Photo by Marc van der Chijs

Calls for the “Muslim world” to put greater pressure on China for its treatment of its minority Muslim population in Xinjiang are destined to fail. The economic reasons for the reluctance of many Muslim-majority states are obvious but they are not even the prime reasons for the perceived indifference.

China’s Muslims represent a vastly different religious culture from Muslims in other parts of Asia – let alone to those in the Middle East – making it difficult for Uyghurs and other minority ethnic groups to create the kind of communal understanding required for Muslims elsewhere to regard Xinjiang as a religious conflict instead of a domestic issue.

Ethnic conflict involving Muslims in other parts of Asia further complicate matters. In Myanmar, India, the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and elsewhere, Muslim minorities are in conflict either with their governments or with majority ethnic groups; which constrains Asia’s Muslims from building a broad consensus against any one particular party.

Neither does a state capable of providing leadership in the region exist in Asia, nor have any expressed the ambition to do so. Saudi Arabia is a considerable power in the Middle East precisely because of its immense wealth and its willingness to exploit it to indenture its neighbours. But the largest and most resourced Muslim nation in Asia, Indonesia, does not share similar inclinations towards its fellow Muslim-majority states – Bangladesh, Brunei, Malaysia, and Pakistan.

Neither has Saudi Arabia, which no doubt exercises clout within the Sunni Muslim world, shown that it is prepared to take on China about its Uyghur issue. The Saudis are well aware that what happens in Xinjiang ultimately does not rise to an existential problem worth sacrificing the close relationship that the Kingdom shares with China.

China’s ties with other Muslim-majority states in Central Asia through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation have also made it far too costly for these states (namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and the other observer states and dialogue partners) to express disagreement with China’s domestic activities (nor for that matter are those states in any high moral position to do so).

These cultural and geopolitical dynamics of Muslim identity politics in Asia have been the primary reasons why we expectations of a cross-national Muslim bloc to emerge are misguided – in spite of what unsettling information, videos, photographs, interviews, or satellite imagery are published about the state of Xinjiang’s Muslim population.

Photo by Andrew An

The history of Chinese state action against its Uyghur community is well known, but it has only been in recent years that the international scrutiny over its practices has compelled Chinese officials to manage public sentiment more assertively.

Chinese officials have not denied that large numbers of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang – estimates place it at upwards of 1 million – have been placed in mass detention facilities. But they have accepted that whatever reputational losses they suffer from the repression of an ethnic minority are suffered in places – such as the U.S. and Western Europe – which already do not hold China in high esteem to start with.

They have decided that whatever harm is done to their ambitions to be seen as a moderate, credible, and responsible actor on the world stage have been sustained in countries that are unlikely to accept China as a co-equal power anyway; so what harm is done is easily reckoned and predictable.

It is the lack of new challenges to the situation in Xinjiang that suggests that while much international publicity has been generated since 2017, there is no good reason to believe that the mass detention of Uyghurs will stop anytime soon.

So far China has been able to respond to existing criticism by making various perfunctory claims that no one has been detained, or that those held in mass internment facilities have been kept either for a short time or for educational or vocational reasons, or that they have voluntarily admitted, or have already “graduated.”

It is true that these changing narratives are a response to heightened public interest, but much of that interest has escalated in tandem with ongoing U.S.-China strategic competition rather than as a consequence to opposition from Muslim-majority states which have not and cannot consolidate their positions in any meaningful way.

Any objections against China’s actions now might also place Asia’s Muslims in an awkward position of taking common sides with the U.S., which has historically been regarded by Muslims with greater suspicion and mistrust than the Chinese are viewed in Asia.

These are not immutable perceptions and over a long time it is possible that Muslim-majority states in Asia may decide to take a collective and forceful stand against China. But for now Asia’s Muslims can do little more than express gentle dissent in muted and symbolic support for their compatriots in China’s largest province.

By Daud Hassan M.

Editor’s note: The author uses the term “Muslim” to refer to all ethnic groups in Xinjiang, China who subscribe to the Islamic faith. AAA knows that in addition to Uyghurs, there are other Muslim minority ethnic groups such as the Kazakhs and the Hui who live in Xinjiang.

To Win In Hong Kong, Keep Calm

  • Negotiation strategy suggests that whichever side in Hong Kong (SAR government or protesters) de-escalates periodically could come out stronger
  • “Simply escalating” strategies tend to be counterproductive in the long run as it compels the opposing party to embrace escalation too, leading to either attrition or worse, uncontrollable violence

Photo by Han Min T

Violence in Hong Kong has reached fever pitch since protests began nearly half a year ago. Throughout the conflict, there have been periods of calm and periods of high intensity riots corresponding to the weekday work routines and the weekend breaks respectively. Yet there has been a general trend towards escalation of violence since the beginning.

This week, protesters and HK police raised force levels still further, with protesters throwing petrol bombs and bricks, firing arrows, and creating makeshift catapults while garrisoning themselves in college campuses around the city.

Police officers have also shot protesters with live rounds for the second time since riots began, and some experts believe that the more regular warnings from the Chinese central government mean that the HK authorities are likely to increase pressure over the coming weeks.

These actions are moving both sides ever so closely to a situation of armed struggle – in which parties perceive that their only viable strategy is to overwhelm their opponent completely lest a few groups that remain drag the conflict out by a punishing insurgency.

Once all-out armed struggle occurs, it is difficult and dangerous for any party to back down, negotiation becomes risky, and signalling across lines – the act of conveying information to the other party – breaks down due to lack of trust.

But such a situation has not yet arrived in Hong Kong and there is still a way for each party – the HK SAR government and the protesters – to make some progress in preserving their interests while reducing violence at the same time.

Photo by Katherine Cheng

Negotiation strategy suggests that periodic de-escalation could be advantageous for whichever party moves first. First, it is only periodic in order to create regular opportunities for the other side to express or signal an intention to compromise or to reduce force levels without the fear of embarrassment. As it allows both parties to return to the status quo if they choose, it is not a show of defeat.

Second, it is de-escalatory so as not to provoke the other party to repel the action with an even greater force.

If a party adopts a period of de-escalation, it is worth voicing the intention and aim of the draw down before it takes effect so that the opposing party is invited to react positively – by also de-escalating or by agreeing to certain demands – or negatively – by taking advantage of the opening to regroup or to escalate.

Either way, the party which first proposes and commits to a temporary rollback benefits from issuing a credible signal to the other, the potential for reduced conflict, and favorable public perception from the act of self-restraint.

These benefits are increasingly valuable amidst such visible confrontations between the HK authorities and protesters in this era of live-streamed news and continuous reportage of every move by all sides.

As a result of how news tends to spread online, single isolated acts of extreme violence by one or a few persons may be perceived as new consensus tactics by the entire group, raising perceptions of danger unnecessarily in a vicious circle.

Communicating good faith intent by conflict parties is problematic not just in Hong Kong, but in any prolonged conflict characterised by frequent acts of unorganised and egregious violence; these are eventualities that occur when deadlock is imminent and when morale on both sides are rapidly weakening.

For the HK government and for the protesters, “simply escalating” strategies that call for overwhelming force to demonstrate strength or to deter violence are in fact counterproductive in the long run as it compels the opposing party to embrace escalation too, leading to either attrition or worse, uncontrollable violence.

Regardless of which side acts, a mixed strategy of escalation and periodic de-escalation is a far more cost effective method of using limited resources, communicating goals and demands, and winning the moral high ground that is essential for durable victories and for the eventual consolidation of the public trust when conflict ends.

By Ken Masuda