To Win In Hong Kong, Keep Calm

  • Negotiation strategy suggests that whichever side in Hong Kong (SAR government or protesters) de-escalates periodically could come out stronger
  • “Simply escalating” strategies tend to be counterproductive in the long run as it compels the opposing party to embrace escalation too, leading to either attrition or worse, uncontrollable violence

Photo by Han Min T

Violence in Hong Kong has reached fever pitch since protests began nearly half a year ago. Throughout the conflict, there have been periods of calm and periods of high intensity riots corresponding to the weekday work routines and the weekend breaks respectively. Yet there has been a general trend towards escalation of violence since the beginning.

This week, protesters and HK police raised force levels still further, with protesters throwing petrol bombs and bricks, firing arrows, and creating makeshift catapults while garrisoning themselves in college campuses around the city.

Police officers have also shot protesters with live rounds for the second time since riots began, and some experts believe that the more regular warnings from the Chinese central government mean that the HK authorities are likely to increase pressure over the coming weeks.

These actions are moving both sides ever so closely to a situation of armed struggle – in which parties perceive that their only viable strategy is to overwhelm their opponent completely lest a few groups that remain drag the conflict out by a punishing insurgency.

Once all-out armed struggle occurs, it is difficult and dangerous for any party to back down, negotiation becomes risky, and signalling across lines – the act of conveying information to the other party – breaks down due to lack of trust.

But such a situation has not yet arrived in Hong Kong and there is still a way for each party – the HK SAR government and the protesters – to make some progress in preserving their interests while reducing violence at the same time.

Photo by Katherine Cheng

Negotiation strategy suggests that periodic de-escalation could be advantageous for whichever party moves first. First, it is only periodic in order to create regular opportunities for the other side to express or signal an intention to compromise or to reduce force levels without the fear of embarrassment. As it allows both parties to return to the status quo if they choose, it is not a show of defeat.

Second, it is de-escalatory so as not to provoke the other party to repel the action with an even greater force.

If a party adopts a period of de-escalation, it is worth voicing the intention and aim of the draw down before it takes effect so that the opposing party is invited to react positively – by also de-escalating or by agreeing to certain demands – or negatively – by taking advantage of the opening to regroup or to escalate.

Either way, the party which first proposes and commits to a temporary rollback benefits from issuing a credible signal to the other, the potential for reduced conflict, and favorable public perception from the act of self-restraint.

These benefits are increasingly valuable amidst such visible confrontations between the HK authorities and protesters in this era of live-streamed news and continuous reportage of every move by all sides.

As a result of how news tends to spread online, single isolated acts of extreme violence by one or a few persons may be perceived as new consensus tactics by the entire group, raising perceptions of danger unnecessarily in a vicious circle.

Communicating good faith intent by conflict parties is problematic not just in Hong Kong, but in any prolonged conflict characterised by frequent acts of unorganised and egregious violence; these are eventualities that occur when deadlock is imminent and when morale on both sides are rapidly weakening.

For the HK government and for the protesters, “simply escalating” strategies that call for overwhelming force to demonstrate strength or to deter violence are in fact counterproductive in the long run as it compels the opposing party to embrace escalation too, leading to either attrition or worse, uncontrollable violence.

Regardless of which side acts, a mixed strategy of escalation and periodic de-escalation is a far more cost effective method of using limited resources, communicating goals and demands, and winning the moral high ground that is essential for durable victories and for the eventual consolidation of the public trust when conflict ends.

By Ken Masuda

One thought on “To Win In Hong Kong, Keep Calm”

  1. Ken, overall I agree with your points although I would argue that the point of no return might have been reached this past week.

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